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RESUMO: Este artigo examina a relação entre etnografia e análise de
discurso. Começa delineando a variação considerável nos tipos de trabalho
que se abrigam sob um desses termos. Similitudes e tensões entre essas
abordagens são assim investigadas. O que tem sido descrito como a
‘recente crítica radical de entrevistas’ é usado como um modo de explorar
as orientações colidentes de alguns tipos de etnografia e análise de
discurso. Esta avaliação crítica está fundamentada em argumentos que
podem ser encontrados dentro da etnografia, mas também têm sido
motivados por algumas formas de análise de discurso. Na parte final do
texto, sugere-se, que há boas razões para qualificar os argumentos
construídos na crítica radical e que o valor da prática analítica discursiva
é mais bem compreendida dentro de uma visão etnográfica menos
restritiva.
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2ABSTRACT: This paper examines the relationship between ethnography
and discourse analysis. It begins by outlining the considerable variation in
kinds of work that come under each of those headings. Similarities and
tensions between these approaches are then investigated. What has been
described as the ‘recent radical critique of interviews’ is used as one
way of exploring the conflicting orientations of some kinds of ethnography
and discourse analysis. This critique is founded on arguments that can be
found within ethnography, but that have also motivated some forms of
discourse analysis. It is suggested in the final part of the paper that there
are good reasons to qualify the arguments built into the radical critique,
and that the value of discourse analytic practice is best understood from
within a broadly ethnographic orientation.
KEYWORDS: Discourse analysis, ethnography, interviews.
My focus in this paper is on two closely related questions: can
ethnography and discourse analysis be combined; and should they be
combined – in other words, would this be beneficial? Some commentators
give positive answers to these questions, and there have often been
attempts to bring the two approaches together in some way. Many years
ago, having been taught conversation analysis as well as traditional forms
of ethnography, I used them both in my PhD research looking at social
interaction in secondary schools (Hammersley 1980; see also 1974, 1976
and 1977). I employed the work of Harvey Sacks (see Sacks 1992),
largely implicitly, to understand the roles of teacher and pupils in the
classroom. However, my aim was to draw conclusions of a rather
conventional sociological kind about schooling and its functioning in society.
So, while in one sense I was combining ethnography with conversation
analysis, most conversation analysts would deny that I had done this.
Instead, they would probably see me as having abused conversation
analysis for the purposes of ethnography. I had extracted conversation
analysis from its ethnomethodological context and put some elements of
it to work within a different framework. What this makes clear is that
much hinges on what one means by combining ethnography and discourse
analysis: combined in what relationship?
A second problem arises from the fact that ‘discourse analysis’ and
‘ethnography’ are both umbrella terms: in other words, each covers a
3variety of kinds of work. Therefore, any answer to the questions I have
posed requires some discrimination amongst versions of discourse analysis
and of ethnography. I will begin, therefore, by sketching some of the
heterogeneity on each side.
Diversity within discourse analysis
In the case of discourse analysis, it is possible to identify three broad
types of approach, in rather crude terms. First, there are those which are
inspired primarily by post-structuralism, and especially by the work of
Foucault.1 For Foucault, and for many post-Marxists, discourses are socio-
historical forms of practice that are constitutive of the subjects and objects
that make up the world defined within particular truth regimes. Foucault
himself looked at the discourses surrounding madness, medicine and
various forms of social and psychological science, treating these as
constitutive of modernity. In a more conventional historiographical
application of this approach, three discourses have been identified that,
in a conflictual configuration, were the framework within which eighteenth
century French revolutionaries construed the ancien regime and sought
to construct the new society that they wanted to bring about (Baker
1990). Other writers have looked at discourses operating in more recent
times, for example those surrounding social inclusion (Levitas 1998) and
sexuality (Hollway 1989).
The other two broad kinds of discourse analysis I will mention involve
closer study of specific texts, or of transcripts of verbal social interaction.
One approach is based on linguistics, of one sort or another. Here the
same kinds of distinction that have been applied to language below the
level of the sentence are deployed above that level: to whole paragraphs
and texts in the case of written materials, and to turn-taking and storytelling
in the case of oral talk. Moreover, it is often argued that the whole structure
of language needs to be taken into account in interpreting any piece of
discourse.2 Some influential versions of linguistics-based discourse
1 There are also approaches that draw on Derrida’s work. See, for example, MacLure
2003. On Foucault’s version of discourse analysis, see Gutting 1989 and Howarth 2000.
2 For an early example of this argument in the field of education, see Stubbs 1986. See also
Stubbs 1983, Levinson 1983, and Schiffrin et al 2001 for accounts and illustrations of
the kinds of discourse analysis that fall under this second heading.
4analysis are also committed to locating patterns of discourse within a
wider social context, for example identifying how these function to
reproduce or challenge existing social structures. This is true of the critical
linguistics of Fowler, Kress and Hodge and of the critical discourse analysis
of Fairclough (Fowler 1991; Kress and Hodge 1979; Fairclough 1995
and 2001).
The third category of discourse analysis is even more of a mixed bag
than the others. It includes social psychological and sociological
approaches, ranging from the work of van Dijk through that of Potter
and Wetherell all the way to conversation analysis of the kind championed
by Schegloff and others (van Dijk 1991; Potter and Wetherell 1989;
Schegloff 1997). And there has been considerable mutual influence among
these. Indeed, the version championed by Potter and Wetherell, perhaps
the most widely influential of all, was explicitly a combination of several
extant approaches. And the subsequent work of these two authors has
come to diverge in significant ways: Wetherell now labels her work critical
discursive psychology, while Potter has moved closer to conversation
analysis. Even within conversation analysis there have been major disputes,
notably over whether institutional talk is different in character from more
informal kinds of talk (Boden and Zimmerman 1991; Drew and Heritage
1992), and over the possibility of feminist and ‘critical’ versions (Speer
1999; Kitzinger 2000; Bogen and Lynch 1990; McHoul 1994). Indeed,
what has happened over time is that further hybrid varieties have emerged,
combining one or more of the existing strands as well as elements from
beyond. Thus both Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis and Wetherell’s
critical discursive psychology are influenced by post-structuralist ideas,
yet there still remain significant differences between these two projects
(Fairclough 1992; Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999; Wetherell 1998).
Heterogeneity within ethnography
If we turn to ethnography, it is much more difficult to give a clear
outline of the variety in approach to be found under this heading. The
term has been in use for a much longer period, and has been shaped by
3 For the influence of positivism on early anthropological ethnography, see Strenski
1982. For the influence of some of these other ideas, see Atkinson and Hammersley
1994.
5disciplinary differences and rivalries as well as by many shifts in theoretical
orientation and empirical focus. A range of philosophical, theoretical, and
methodological ideas have shaped ethnographic work over the course of
its history. These include positivism, functionalism, Marxism, pragmatism,
phenomenology, hermeneutics, structuralism, post-structuralism, and
constructionism.3 Only an extremely crude characterisation of the effects
of these influences can be provided here. Positivism and functionalism
encouraged ethnographers to document actual patterns of social
behaviour, rather than just artefacts and beliefs, and to explain these in
terms of the needs that any individual or society must meet. By contrast,
Marxism, pragmatism, phenomenology, and hermeneutics led to greater
emphasis on differences in orientation not only between societies but
also within them, and to greater concern with documenting the cultural
interpretations that inform patterns of action. Structuralism, post-
structuralism, and constructionism have encouraged a focus on language
and discourse that has led to some important departures from previous
practice. In some cases, linguistics has been taken as a model for how to
understand all aspects of human social life, treating these as generated
by the deep structure of human nature. More commonly today,
ethnographers come to pay closer attention to the language people use in
the course of what they are doing, and in describing their lives in interviews,
with a view to understanding how in some sense they ongoingly and
discursively construct the social phenomena that characterise the society
to which they belong. And from this it is a short step, though one with
large implications, to a more radical kind of constructionism that views
ethnographers themselves as effectively constituting social reality through
their writing (see, for example, Clifford and Marcus 1986). These various
influences have generated divisions within ethnography: between work
that adopts a micro-focus in which the role of local context is emphasised
and work which emphasises understanding the local in terms of the societal
or global context; between approaches that insist on the need for an
analytic perspective and those that demand a ‘critical’ orientation; and
between those which seek to document hidden realities and those that
are concerned with the discursive construction of ‘reality’.
In terms of research practice, we can also map significant patterns
of change and diversification from early forms of anthropological fieldwork
through to some more recent types of research that are labelled
6ethnographic within the social sciences. For most anthropologists, from
the early twentieth century onwards, ethnography involved actually living
in the communities of the people being studied, round the clock, with the
fieldwork taking place over a relatively long period of time, usually years.
By contrast, today, the term ‘ethnography’ is standardly used to refer
simply to studies that involve some participant observation and/or in-
depth, relatively unstructured interviews. For example, sociological
ethnographers do not usually live with the people they study, they typically
focus on what happens in a particular situation or institution when it is in
operation, so that their ethnography is part-time in relation to the lives of
the people studied. In fact, this is now increasingly true even of Western
anthropologists where they study ‘at home’ in their own society or in
other large complex societies. To a considerable degree, this reflects the
nature of those societies: that people do not all live and work together in
the same places in the way that they did previously in more traditional
communities. Equally important, however, the fieldwork carried out by
ethnographers is likely to last months rather than years. This reflects,
perhaps, the increasing pace of academic life, notably the demand that
publications be produced rapidly. However, it has also been stimulated
by the turn to more micro-focused analysis, encouraged by the availability
of lightweight audio- and video-recorders, which allow much more detailed
recording of data than did the previous reliance solely on fieldnotes.
Some of the shifts in the practice of ethnography are thrown into
relief by the growth, in recent years, of so-called internet or virtual
ethnography (see Hine 2000, Mann and Stewart 2000, and Paccagnella
1997). Here, all the data are usually collected on-line without meeting
the people concerned face-to-face. This raises the question: does
ethnography depend upon the physical presence of the ethnographer in
the midst of the people being studied? Or does the assumption that an
ethnographer must be physically present involve an outdated idea of what
is required for ethnographic work? Perhaps it even implies a false notion
of personhood in a postmodern world? Equally important, the situations
being studied in internet ethnography are virtual ones, rather than being
particular physical locations. Given this, should we talk about on-line
cultures? Or can we only understand what happens on-line in the context
of the ordinary, that is off-line, lives of the people who produce blogs, put
messages on message boards, participate in chat rooms, set up their own
7web-sites, and so on? Alternatively, should we recognise that even the
cultures that ordinary ethnography studies are also ‘virtual’, in a certain
sense? After all, they are not objects that we can see or touch. And
perhaps the very distinction between on- and off-line is misleading? Mark
Poster, amongst others, has argued that postmodernity de-centres and
disperses identities, and blurs the boundaries between humans and
machines (Poster 1990). One of the effects of these, and other,
developments is bring some forms of ethnography quite close, in practice,
to forms of discourse analysis.
I hope I have been able to give here at least some sense of how ideas
about ethnography have changed over time, generating substantial
variation in how it is pursued and in what it produces.
Compatibilities and incompatibilities
For a variety of reasons, there are considerable overlaps in orientation
and practice between the various kinds of work that come under the
headings of ethnography and discourse analysis. In recent times, they
have mostly been resolutely qualitative rather than quantitative, with a
focus on meaning-construction and a reliance on unstructured
observational and/or interview data. Moreover, some of the
incompatibilities that exist are between particular forms of each type of
inquiry, rather than between the two approaches overall. Nevertheless,
there are some important differences and tensions that need to be
examined. In what follows I will focus primarily on the third kind of
discourse analysis outlined above, though I will begin by briefly examining
the compatibility of the other two with ethnography.
If we take the first sort of discourse analysis, influenced primarily by
post-structuralism, in some respects this involves much the same challenge
to ethnography as structuralism did in the past. For some anthropologists,
Levi-Strauss’s structuralism was compatible with ethnography, whereas
others saw it as in conflict with what they held to be most important in
ethnography.4 It is clearly possible to use ethnographic data to document
4 For examples of diverse responses to Lévi-Strauss’s work, see Hayes and Hayes1970.
Maybury-Lewis’s chapter is an exemplary reaction against what he sees as the
ethnographic failings of Lévi-Strauss’s analysis of myths. There is a parallel here with
critiques of Foucault’s work by some historians, see Merquior 1985:ch5 and Gutting
1994.
8the character and operation of various discourses in much the same way
that Foucault and others have drawn on documentary evidence. There
is, at the same time, conflict between this type of post-structuralist work
and elements of the theoretical orientations that have previously shaped
ethnography, some of which have emphasised the role of the perspectives
and actions of individual actors in generating social phenomena. Those
who have sought to combine ethnography with this sort of discourse
analysis have recognised ‘conflict and discontinuity’ but emphasised
‘convergence’ (see Tambouku and Ball 2003:ix); whereas other
ethnographers are more sceptical about the possibility or value of this.
Whether we find an unacceptable conflict here will depend upon what
aspects of previously influential theoretical and methodological ideas we
build into our definition of ethnography, and also on how much emphasis
we give to the need for an internally consistent orientation.
Turning to the second broad category of discourse analysis, that which
draws on linguistics, there is often a significant difference in focus from
ethnography; one that reflects commitment to different disciplines. Where
linguistic discourse analysts are often concerned to identify the rules that
generate particular discursive patterns, ethnographers are usually more
concerned with what the discourse is being used to do, with the social
factors that drive its use as part of patterns of situational and institutional
action, and with the social consequences of that use. Another difference
is methodological in character: discourse analysts usually rely entirely on
textual or audio-recorded data, whereas ethnographers will often combine
these sources with a much wider range of data. Of course, these
differences in orientation have already been negotiated, to some degree,
within anthropological linguistics and socio-linguistics (see, for example,
Gumperz and Hymes 1972; Hymes 1977 and 1996; Gumperz 1982).
Moreover, with critical linguistics and critical discourse analysis, there is
much less of a difference in orientation, at least in terms of focus.5
5 For some ethnographers this type of work raises serious methodological problems about
the evidence used in making generalisations about the usage of particular discursive
forms, in assigning functions to that usage, in explaining the factors which produce
those functions, and in claiming that the discursive forms identified have specific socio-
political consequences. However, to a large extent, this is a replay of traditional
ethnographic criticisms of those forms of social analysis, including various forms of
Marxism, that rely on documentary and other kinds of data to make broad, macro
claims about social structure and process. Some dismiss such analysis as speculative, but
others have insisted that ethnographic data cannot but be interpreted against the
background of a societal or global – that is, a macro-theoretical – context. For a recent
example, see Burawoy et al 2000.
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both compatibilities and tensions. I can illustrate this by discussing a dispute
that has arisen over ethnographers’ use of interview data, which has
drawn on arguments that are central to the rationale for discourse analysis.
Traditionally, interview data have been used by ethnographers in at
least two ways. First, they have been employed to provide information
about events and settings that were not open to observation by the
ethnographer him- or herself: because they happened before the fieldwork
began or because for some reason the ethnographer was not able to gain
access to them. Equally important, informants’ accounts have also been
used as sources of additional information about events or settings that
ethnographers have been able to observe, either to cover parts of them
that were not accessible or to offer a different perspective on what was
seen. In other words, interviewees have frequently been used as surrogate
researchers to provide second-hand information about the world: to give
researchers access to what informants have themselves witnessed or to
information that they have acquired from others.
The second ethnographic use of informants’ accounts is as a way of
gaining understanding of the perspectives, attitudes, beliefs, or values of
the people being studied. These are often not accessible via observation,
and ethnographers have insisted that without understanding them it is
sometimes impossible even to describe accurately what people are doing,
even less to explain why they do what they do. So, here, interview data
are used to identify stable attitudes or perspectives on the part of
informants; in other words, attitudes or perspectives that are taken to
govern their behaviour in other contexts. An example would be
interviewing employees within an organisation about their attitudes
towards the management, these being assumed to guide much of their
everyday behaviour at work.
A recent ‘radical critique’ of interviews has rejected both of these
standard uses of interview data (Murphy et al 1998:120-3; for examples
of this critique, see Dingwall 1997; Silverman 1997; Atkinson and Coffey
2002). Moreover, it points in two rather different directions as regards
the practice of research. One possible conclusion is that interviews should
be abandoned, on the grounds that the only reliable form of data comes
from observation of naturally occurring social interaction in which the
researcher is not a key participant. A quite different response, more widely
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adopted, is to argue that while interviews cannot be used in the usual
ways, they can be employed to generate data about the discursive
resources or practices by which people construct social phenomena.
These two rather different recommendations match the attitudes of
conversation analysis, on the one hand, and the sort of discourse analysis
originally advocated by Potter and Wetherell, on the other. Either way,
the radical critique seems to require, in effect, the reconstruction of
ethnography into a form that is much more like discourse analysis.
In order to understand what is at stake here, we need to give attention
to the arguments underlying the radical critique of interviewing. As we
shall see, elements of all these arguments can be found within the
ethnographic tradition, but in the context of this critique they take on
more extreme forms. So, in this respect, like many others, there is both
continuity and difference between ethnography and discourse analysis.
The first argument is what has sometimes been referred to as
naturalism (see Hammersley and Atkinson 1995:ch1). This amounts to a
desire to understand social phenomena as they occur naturally in the
world (rather than under artificial conditions), so that, as far as possible,
the data employed must be uninfluenced by the research process and the
researcher. This was the basis on which many ethnographers rejected
the use of experimental approaches to understanding human behaviour,
and it also led them to adopt roles in collecting data that are designed to
minimise reactivity. While this naturalism rarely resulted in their rejecting
interviews as a source of data, it did encourage both an emphasis on the
centrality of participant observation and the adoption of relatively
unstructured approaches to interviewing, designed to simulate ordinary
conversation. By contrast with this, some versions of the radical critique
do use naturalism as a basis for rejecting the standard uses of interview
data – on the grounds that people’s responses in interviews are so heavily
shaped by the context, and especially by the influence of the interviewer,
that reliable inferences about their knowledge of, or behaviour in, other
situations are impossible. Where, previously, reactivity in interviews was
seen as an important problem to be addressed, it is treated by the radical
critics as irremediable.
The second argument behind the radical critique contrasts the results
of scientific observation by the researcher with the everyday accounts
produced in interviews by informants. Within ethnography, there had
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always been recognition that informants’ accounts are not normally based
on rigorous data collection and recording, and therefore are likely to be
selective, inferential, and subject to distortion by memory. As a result,
they were seen as requiring careful checking. Once again, the radical
critique pushes this argument further. Drawing on what we might call
phenomenological empiricism, it insists that for analysis to be rigorous
the data employed must be, in some sense, immediately given rather than
fallible. In the context of phenomenological philosophy the data would be
phenomena given to consciousness, once all background assumptions
have been bracketed out. In the context of discourse analysis the given
data are audio- or video-recordings, and transcriptions of these. In short,
then, reliance on informants’ accounts must be abandoned because, since
they are not the product of rigorous scientific analysis, there is no way of
discounting their methodological weaknesses so as to extract valid
knowledge. Equally important, an increase in the rigour of observation
by the researcher is demanded, this is now to be limited to what is
evidenced in the behaviour of the people being studied, as recorded or
transcribed.
The third argument behind the radical critique might usefully be labelled
discursive psychology (see Edwards 1997). This is a general philosophical
argument to the effect that mind is displayed in public behaviour rather
than being a matter of internal, private experience. Interestingly, this is
analogous in some ways to George Herbert Mead’s social behaviourism,
on which symbolic interactionist ethnography was based (Blumer 1969).
Mead argued that we must understand human psychology in terms of a
dynamic interplay between an active force that is rather fluid in character,
the ‘I’, and various definitions of self, actual and imagined, the ‘me’, that
are introjected by the actor in seeking to make sense of others’ behaviour
and anticipate their reactions to his or her future actions. Despite the
similarities with discursive psychology, Mead’s social psychology was
not interpreted by ethnographers as denying either the existence or
importance of insider or relatively private knowledge, and they have
generally been concerned with gaining access to such knowledge, often
by means of interviews. By contrast, from the point of view of discursive
psychology, accounts of ‘subjective’ phenomena - of beliefs, attitudes,
past experience, etc – are not to be treated as more or less accurate
representations of cognitive activity or of private knowledge or experience
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but analysed instead as public, discursive displays through which actions,
contexts, and even subjectivities are ongoingly constituted. In these terms,
the use of interviews to gain insider accounts is ruled out. Instead, we
must analyse the narrative forms or rhetorical strategies people employ
when they talk about their experiences.
The final line of argument that can be identified within the radical
critique is scepticism about the idea that accounts can ever represent
reality at all, whether this is ‘external’ or ‘internal’ reality. There has long
been an element of scepticism built into some influential kinds of
ethnography, in the sense that the perspectives of the people studied
have often been viewed as constructed on the basis of distinctive cultural
assumptions, and/or as designed to serve various functions, rather than
as simply reflecting the nature of the world (Hammersley 1992:ch3).
And there has sometimes been a tendency for recognition of cultural
pluralism to turn into epistemological relativism: in other words, the idea
that ‘the world’ is constructed in different ways by different cultures has
resulted in the conclusion that there are multiple realities rather than a
single one. The radical critics sometimes draw on such relativism, and
effectively push it into scepticism, suggesting that informants’ accounts
must be treated not as true or false but rather as constitutive - as
themselves producing one of many possible versions of events. From
this point of view, reality is constructed in and through the telling, rather
than having characteristics that are independent of this. Thus, the radical
critics argue that we should not judge informants’ accounts in terms of
whether or not they are accurate. Rather, we should study how people
construct accounts, what discursive resources they employ, and perhaps
why they portray things in the ways that they do. Equally important, this
argument involves an agnosticism, at best, about whether there are such
things as feelings, attitudes, values, etc that motivate people’s behaviour.
There is a distrust of any appeal to relatively stable, underlying factors
that generate appearances, in favour of an emphasis on the complexity
and flux of what is on the surface of social life.
These arguments are not entirely compatible with one another, at
least in their fully-extended forms. For example, scepticism is in conflict
with both phenomenological empiricism and discursive psychology, since
the latter involve claims to knowledge. Perhaps as a result of this, in the
context of discourse analysis we find varying emphases on each of these
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arguments, leading to rather different forms of research. As an illustration,
we can contrast two forms. The first accepts naturalism, insists on a
severe, empiricist threshold for the acceptance of evidence, adopts
discursive psychology, but subordinates scepticism to these other
arguments. This is the position taken by many conversation analysts. By
contrast, some other discourse analysts reject naturalism in favour the
idea that the researcher cannot but be part of the social world being
investigated, and therefore must both influence it and be influenced by it.
As a result, they also do not place much emphasis on empiricism.
However, they do adopt discursive psychology, and draw on scepticism.
In fact, neither of these positions is entirely stable, and most discourse
analysts probably draw on all four arguments at one time or another.
It is worth emphasising that these arguments at the core of discourse
analysis have radical implications not only for interviews but also for the
analysis of observational data, indeed for the question of what does and
does not count as such data. In relation to ethnography, they largely rule
out the use of fieldnotes, since these cannot simply be a record of what
happened: human observation and note-taking are necessarily selective
and inferential. In writing fieldnotes we formulate in particular ways who
was involved and what they did, and there are always alternative possible
and valid formulations. So, for discourse analysts, instead of the observer
being the research instrument, reliance is to be placed on mechanical
means of audio- or video-recording.6 These are taken to produce records
rather than interpretations or inferential accounts. And, for conversation
analysts, inference is to be limited in the process of analysis too: to what
is ‘evidenced’, so that the only context to be employed is that which is
displayed as relevant within the data.
Now, it seems to me that none of these arguments is entirely
convincing, either as a rationale for rejecting the normal uses of interview
data or as a basis for discourse analysis. While the first, naturalism, points
to an important threat to validity, seeking to minimise reactivity is not the
only way to deal with it; equally important is to try to understand its
effects, to adopt a reflexive stance (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995).
6 Interestingly, there are some exceptions even within conversation analysis. Sacks
sometimes relied on recalled data, and Schegloff also does this when seeking to understand
what is involved in people giving directions to one another: Schegloff 1971.
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The second argument, empiricism, highlights the need for research to
draw on evidence about what people are doing that is beyond reasonable
doubt in its validity. However, there is little justification for extreme forms
of empiricism that claim to narrow down what can count as evidence to
empirical givens that are beyond all doubt (see Hammersley 1992 and
2003). The attempt to do this is futile: mechanical recording devices are
always selective, and in order to use what they produce in analysis further
selection and also interpretation and inference are required. Thus, a
transcription is not simply an audio-recording written down, it is a cultural
product designed to represent certain aspects of what was caught on
tape, for particular purposes. The point is even more obvious with
transcriptions of video-recordings, where some means has to be found
of representing non-verbal behaviour. The third argument, discursive
psychology, also contains an important element of truth: that people’s
accounts of their experiences are formulated in language that is by its
nature a collective resource, and will be shaped by notions of who can
say what, how, when, and to whom. However, this does not require us to
deny that people have unique personal experiences, or that they have
distinctive sources of information that may not be immediately accessible
to others or publicly reported. Finally, while scepticism can be useful for
methodological purposes, as an existential commitment it undercuts any
kind of research, and indeed any kind of knowledge or belief. In
methodological terms, by suspending interest in whether informants’
accounts are true we can open up a new area of investigation: the
rhetorical strategies or narrative structures to be found in such accounts.
In these terms, discourse analysis would not be in competition with
ethnography, but simply a different enterprise with a different focus;
and, indeed, one that might generate resources that could be of great use
to ethnographers. By contrast, adopting scepticism as an epistemological
commitment involves rejecting not just ethnography but discourse analysis
too, in favour of producing self-subversive texts that continually undermine
any knowledge claims they make (See, for example, Ashmore 1989).
So, while all four of the arguments underpinning discourse analysis
can be found within ethnography, as rudimentary elements, any attempt
to apply them in unqualified form rules out most of the sorts of data that
ethnographers have traditionally employed, many of the uses they have
made of those data, and almost all of the topics they have normally
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addressed. Doing this demands a fundamental re-specification of the
research enterprise, one which at best effectively reduces it entirely to a
form of discourse analysis. The costs of this re-specification are judged
by many ethnographers to be excessive and unnecessary. However,
others are drawn to discourse analysis, believing that it avoids some of
the methodological problems with which ethnography has always had
difficulty in dealing, and provides an account of human social life that is
more in keeping with its fundamental character. For the reasons I have
indicated, in my view this is an illusion.
Conclusion
Returning to the questions I posed at the beginning of this paper, it is
clear that there are ways in which ethnography and discourse analysis,
of various kinds, can be combined. However, this usually involves
abandoning some of the key ideas and practices on one or both sides in
order to bring about compatibility. Forms of discourse analysis can be
extracted from their usual methodological and theoretical infrastructures
so as to make them compatible with ethnography. And ethnography can
be re-engineered to make it compatible with, or to turn it into, discourse
analysis. I have more sympathy with the first of these strategies than
with the second: I have tried to show that the methodological arguments
that underpin the radical critique of interviews, which motivate advocacy
of discourse analysis as a competitor to ethnography, have long been
part of the ethnographic tradition in moderate forms. And there are good
reasons not to adopt more extreme interpretations of them. Indeed, doing
so in a consistent way would make it difficult even for discourse analysts
to sustain the claim that they can produce knowledge of the social world.
So, while discourse analysis is legitimate as an enterprise adopting a
different focus from ethnography, being concerned with discursive
patterns, rhetorical strategies, or narrative structures, it cannot supplant
ethnography and other kinds of social research. At the same time, the
ideas and methods that have been developed by discourse analysts can
be valuable resources for ethnographers, enabling them to engage in
more detailed analysis of talk and texts than was common in the past;
and, of course, many ethnographers have already availed themselves of
this.
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It is perhaps worth emphasising, however, that discourse analysis also
serves the function of highlighting some problems within ethnography, arising
from the clash between the various methodological arguments on which it
has relied. In fact, facing up to discourse analysis is, for an ethnographer,
rather like looking into a distorting mirror that tells us more about ourselves
than we may wish to know. The difficult, unresolved problems that I have
identified – about the nature of agency, the relationship between
representational and functional roles of concepts, how far we can rely on
insider accounts, the problem of reactivity, and so on – have long been
present within ethnography. Furthermore, discourse analysis also underlines
problems ethnographers frequently have these days in talking about facts
or about truth, or even about knowledge; we tend to put scare quotes
around these terms, to indicate that we do not want to be committed to
anything so naïve as realism. The appeal of discourse analysis for some
ethnographers, I suspect, is that it seems to promise a way of carrying on
doing research without that commitment. Yet, it cannot deliver on that
promise. Instead, we must recognise that we cannot be researchers without,
in effect, being realists, though not necessarily naïve ones.
There may be a great deal to be gained from combining ethnography
with discourse analysis. However, it should be clear from the arguments
presented in this paper that this is not a straightforward matter. The
relationship between the two highlights some quite difficult issues about
the nature of the social world and how we can understand it. Putting the
two together and glossing over the conflicts and tensions will not improve
matters. However, engaging carefully with the range of methodological
and philosophical arguments to be found under these two headings may
lead to a more secure basis for improving social research in general.
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